(*) This article was first published on December 12, 2025, in the online magazine Yeni Arayış in Turkish and was translated into English by Murat Özbank.

Abstract

This article reconsiders the concept of narcissism, which is often used in popular culture and everyday language in negative, reductionist, and conceptually blurred ways, through the lens of psychoanalytic literature. Contrary to common belief, it argues that narcissism begins not as a pathological deviation of the self but as an indispensable foundation of psychic development. Drawing on Freud’s distinction between primary and secondary narcissism, the article shows that narcissism is closely tied to the organization of libidinal investments between the self and the external world. Kohut’s self psychology, Winnicott’s distinction between the true and false self, and Kernberg’s emphasis on structure and aggression illustrate how different theoretical perspectives have conceptualized the boundaries between healthy and pathological narcissism. The article also draws on relational psychoanalysis to understand narcissism not as a fixed internal trait but as a process shaped through reciprocity, recognition, and the equal standing of subjects. Within this framework, healthy narcissism is defined as the capacity to experience oneself as valuable, to be wounded without disintegrating, and to exist in relationships without losing oneself. The article provides a theoretical foundation for examining the pathological, collective, and contemporary forms of narcissism to be discussed in the rest of the series.

Keywords: healthy narcissism, self, psychoanalysis, selfhood, relational psychoanalysis, recognition

x x x

Introduction

From everyday conversations to relationship advice circulating on social media, the word narcissist is used so frequently and carelessly that it has become an almost catch-all label. It is often applied to every form of selfishness, arrogance, lack of empathy, and even relationship difficulties. In popular culture, calling someone a narcissist usually means they are “self-centered,” “conceited,” or “difficult to deal with.” In the psychoanalytic literature, however, narcissism is a much deeper, more nuanced, and developmental concept. The confusion created by the excessive and inaccurate use of the term makes it harder to understand both individual development and our relational world. As the concept is stripped of its substance, it becomes a less and less useful tool for both clinical and social analysis.

The purpose of this four-part series is to dispel that confusion by reestablishing conceptual clarity around narcissism. To do so, the series approaches narcissism as a continuum that extends from individual psychic life to social structures and even to today’s digital and AI-assisted architectures of the self. Throughout, the discussion aims to remain as accessible as possible and to avoid unnecessary professional jargon.

The series is organized into four installments, each examining a distinct layer of narcissism:

1. Healthy narcissism

2. Pathological narcissism

3. Collective narcissism

4. New forms of narcissism amplified by artificial intelligence

A central premise of the series challenges one of the most common misconceptions about the concept: narcissism does not begin as a pathological phase of the self. Instead, it emerges as an indispensable foundation of every person’s psychic organization.

With that framework in place, this first article focuses on the often overlooked and frequently misunderstood dimension of healthy narcissism.

Freud and Narcissism: The Story of the Self from Mythology to Psychoanalysis

The origins of the concept of narcissism reach back to a story much older than psychoanalysis. In Greek mythology, Narcissus is the young man who falls in love with his reflection in the water and eventually wastes away in that love. This story helped establish, in popular culture, the nearly automatic association of narcissism with “self-admiration,” “selfishness,” and “disregard for others.” When Freud transformed this mythological figure into a psychoanalytic concept, however, he did not approach the matter merely as a superficial moral category such as “self-love.” Rather, he understood narcissism as a necessary, universal psychic process intrinsic to the formation of the self.

Freud’s 1914 essay “On Narcissism: An Introduction” is, in this respect, a foundational text (Freud, 1914/1957). For Freud, libido—that is, the psychic energy associated with the life drive—is directed at times toward objects in the external world and at other times directly toward the self. When libido is directed toward the self, the resulting state is narcissism.

In this essay, Freud defines the concept of primary narcissism. In early life, before the infant can clearly distinguish between the self and the external world, all libidinal investment is concentrated within the self. This state is not pathological; it is a necessary starting point in the development of the self. For the infant, the world is initially filled with extensions of the self: the satisfaction of hunger, the continuity of care, bodily contact, and soothing lay the first building blocks of the sense that the self is valuable and that life is worth living. This early narcissistic foundation later becomes the basis for many psychic capacities that appear as self-confidence, self-worth, and coping capacity.

Freud also defines the concept of secondary narcissism. In normal development, libido gradually moves outward from the self and becomes invested in objects in the external world. In certain cases, however, this investment is withdrawn and redirected once again toward the self. Freud locates pathological narcissism precisely at this point: where libidinal ties to the external world have weakened. As the ego turns inward, the relational field becomes impoverished.

In this context, the central criterion in Freud’s theory for distinguishing healthy narcissism from pathological narcissism is this: Can libido circulate freely between the self and the world, or does it become locked exclusively within the self? In healthy narcissism, the person can invest both in the self and in others. In pathological narcissism, by contrast, the ego either places itself at the absolute center or reduces the external world to a stage that exists only to provide narcissistic supply.

The theoretical door Freud opened would become the foundation for all later debates on narcissism: narcissism is an ambivalent force that grounds both health and pathology.

Kohut on Healthy Narcissism and the Threshold of Pathology: The Repairable Core of the Self

Heinz Kohut reconceptualizes narcissism in terms of the development of the self. For him, narcissism is not an excess to be repressed, but an indispensable developmental pathway in the formation of a healthy sense of self (Kohut, 1971; 1977). The infant can develop a self only through the caregiver’s responses. It is in this context that Kohut speaks of selfobject functions.

Kohut identifies three basic narcissistic needs: mirroring, idealization, and a sense of likeness, or twinship. When these needs are adequately met, the child internalizes the regulatory functions provided from the outside and develops a stable, resilient core of the self. This process unfolds through “optimal frustrations”: the self is not completely shaken; instead, it encounters small, tolerable disruptions and grows a little stronger through each one. In Kohut’s account, healthy narcissism is the capacity to regulate the self from within: to soothe oneself, sustain one’s sense of self-worth, and remain present in relationships without disintegrating.

Pathology, by contrast, emerges where this process of internalization is chronically interrupted. Pathological narcissism refers to a fragile self-structure that continually seeks approval and admiration from the outside. In Kohut’s framework, the core problem is not that the self is excessively inflated, but that it has not been adequately held.

Winnicott: True Self, False Self, and Healthy Narcissism

Winnicott does not conceptualize narcissism directly, yet few thinkers articulate as clearly the connection between healthy narcissism and the true self (Winnicott, 1960). For Winnicott, a child develops a true self within a good-enough caregiving environment. This structure rests on the feeling that “I exist, and my feelings are valid.” It is precisely on this ground of authenticity that healthy narcissism develops.

When the caregiving environment cannot hold the child’s spontaneity, however, the child develops a false self that overadapts to external expectations to preserve the relationship. Although this structure may look impressive from the outside, inwardly it often operates together with feelings of emptiness and worthlessness. From Winnicott’s perspective, pathological narcissism often takes the form of the false self’s public façade: bright on the surface, hollow within, and therefore constantly seeking admiration.

Kernberg: Structure, Aggression, and the Distinction Between Healthy and Pathological Narcissism

Otto Kernberg approaches narcissism in terms of personality organization and the regulation of aggression (Kernberg, 1975; 2004). Healthy narcissism requires an integrated self-structure capable of holding together good and bad experiences. Within such a structure, the person can maintain self-love while also forming a libidinal bond with another person.

In pathological narcissism, by contrast, splitting defenses predominate. The self is either completely idealized or entirely devalued. Others, too, are idealized or ruthlessly devalued in a similar way. For Kernberg, the most distinctive feature of pathological narcissism is the inability to recognize the other as a separate subject.

Relational Psychoanalysis and Healthy Narcissism: The Formation of the Self Through Reciprocity

Relational psychoanalysis is perhaps the approach that has introduced the most fundamental shift in how narcissism is understood. Whereas classical theories have usually conceived of narcissism in terms of the self’s withdrawal into itself, the ego’s diminished connection to the world, or the withdrawal of libido from objects, the relational perspective treats narcissism as a self-experience that is formed, disrupted, and reorganized within relationships (Mitchell, 1988). From this perspective, narcissism is no longer merely a feature located “inside the person,” but a process continually shaped in the encounter between two—or even more—subjects.

In the line of thought pioneered by Stephen A. Mitchell, the basic premise is this:

The human self is relational from the outset; narcissism, therefore, is necessarily relational as well.

From this perspective, healthy narcissism is not only the person’s capacity to hold the self together from within but also the capacity to regulate self-worth flexibly within relationships with others. In other words, this is neither a structure wholly dependent on external validation nor one that excludes the presence of the other. In a relationship, the self can both preserve itself and open itself to the other.

Relational psychoanalysis takes up Kohut’s concept of the selfobject, but does not confine it to a one-sided language of “need.” Mirroring, idealization, and likeness are no longer simply things the child demands; they are processes of mutual regulation co-created with the caregiver. The infant does not merely want to be “seen”; the infant also influences, alters, and transforms the caregiver’s affective state. For this reason, from a relational perspective, healthy narcissism is understood not as a one-way investment in the self, but as a field of reciprocity in which two selves influence one another.

At this point, Jessica Benjamin’s (1988, 1995) concept of “recognition” becomes central to understanding healthy narcissism. For Benjamin, the fundamental tension of psychic development is this:

To exist as a subject while also being able to recognize the other as a subject.

Healthy narcissism is precisely the ability to sustain this dual capacity. The person can say, “I exist,” but does not do so at the expense of saying, “You do not exist.” The value of the self is not built on the erasure of the other. In pathological narcissism, however, this balance breaks down: either the person establishes only the self as subject and reduces the other to an object (the grandiose structure), or the person can sustain a sense of subjectivity only in the mirror of the other (the vulnerable structure). In both cases, recognition is one-sided; reciprocity collapses.

Philip Bromberg’s (1998, 2003) contribution allows us to rethink healthy narcissism in terms of the self’s flexibility. For Bromberg, psychic health is not a single, closed unity of the self, but the capacity to hold together different self-states that may contradict one another without fragmenting. Within this framework, healthy narcissism does not mean a self that is “always strong,” “always adequate,” and “always admirable.” On the contrary, the self remains truly alive when a person can accept being strong at times, helpless at times, proud at times, and ashamed at times. In pathological narcissism, by contrast, the self is generally locked into a single scene: either a self that must be constantly idealized, or a fragile self that constantly seeks approval.

Stolorow (2002) and the relational-phenomenological approach add an important strand here: healthy narcissism requires a self-organization that does not collapse entirely under the gaze of the other. When traumatic experiences push the self into a structure that closes it off from other gazes and seals it within itself, narcissism gradually becomes a defensive, rigid shell. In this sense, pathological narcissism is not only grandiosity but also a state of deep closure toward the other.

Viewed from a relational perspective, several key indicators of healthy narcissism can be identified:

Self-worth is not wholly dependent on external validation
Criticism does not devastate the self as a whole
Shame can be experienced without paralyzing the self
Admiration may be desired without becoming a dependency
Intimacy does not threaten the self
The other’s subjectivity does not diminish the self

This framework allows us to think of narcissism no longer merely as “self-love” or “self-aggrandizement,” but as the capacity to exist in relationship, undergo disruption, and reconstitute oneself.

Perhaps the most critical contribution of relational psychoanalysis is this:

Healthy narcissism is the capacity of the self to remain intact rather than disintegrate when it comes into contact with the other.

This is neither a matter of losing the true self on the relational stage, as Winnicott describes, nor of inflating the self by erasing the other, as Kernberg suggests. Healthy narcissism refers to a psychic space in which the self can be preserved and transformed through reciprocity.

Healthy Narcissism: A Foundational Ground for Psychic Life

In this first article, we have treated narcissism, contrary to common belief, not merely as a pathological personality trait, but as a foundational psychic ground necessary for the self to hold together. The line that runs from Freud to Kohut, from Winnicott to Kernberg and relational psychoanalysis, shows us this: healthy narcissism is the self’s capacity to feel valuable, to be wounded without disintegrating, and to exist in relationship without losing itself. Neither a self inflated by erasing the other, nor a fragile structure held hostage to the other’s approval.

However, this healthy core cannot always be preserved. Developmental ruptures, trauma, relational breakdowns, and chronic experiences of devaluation can gradually drive narcissism into defensive, vulnerable, or grandiose structures. The next article will examine how and where the transition from this healthy ground into pathological narcissism occurs.

References

Benjamin, J. (1988). The bonds of love: Psychoanalysis, feminism, and the problem of domination. New York, NY: Pantheon.

Benjamin, J. (1995). Like subjects, love objects: Essays on recognition and sexual difference. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Bromberg, P. M. (1998). Standing in the spaces: Essays on clinical process, trauma, and dissociation. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press.

Bromberg, P. M. (2003). One need not be a house to be haunted: On enactment, dissociation, and the dread of not-me. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 13(5), 689–709.

Freud, S. (1957). On narcissism: An introduction. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 14, pp. 67–102). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1914)

Kernberg, O. F. (1975). Borderline conditions and pathological narcissism. New York, NY: Jason Aronson.

Kernberg, O. F. (2004). Normal and pathological narcissism. In Aggressivity, narcissism, and self-destructiveness in the psychotherapeutic relationship (pp. 3–26). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Kohut, H. (1971). The analysis of the self. New York, NY: International Universities Press.

Kohut, H. (1977). The restoration of the self. New York, NY: International Universities Press.

Mitchell, S. (1988). Relational concepts in psychoanalysis: An integration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Stolorow, R. D., Atwood, G. E., & Orange, D. M. (2002). Worlds of experience: Interweaving philosophical and clinical dimensions in psychoanalysis. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Winnicott, D. W. (1960). Ego distortion in terms of true and false self. In The maturational processes and the facilitating environment (1965). London: Hogarth Press.

Narcissism 1.0: Healthy Narcissism

Featured Articles